[ Update - 22 Apr 2011: Towards the end of my deployment to Afghanistan (from Nov 2006 to Apr 2007), I drafted an open-source unclassified report of my views of the conflict, akin to a campaign assessment of how the campaign was unfolding, with recommendations. As it was written in March 2007, I find this an interesting marker to understand the progression of my thinking on the Afghan conflict and my later analyses of competing stabilization strategies. I kept it as it was written then, acronyms, abbreviations and typos. This was my thinking at the time of writing, based on the conditions of the conflict during that period and on my knowledge of it then. This post was put on-line on 22 April 2011, as this intro explains. Enjoy... ]
My personal experience in Afghanistan started when I arrived in Kabul in Nov 2006 to work in the Information Operations (“IO” or “Info Ops”) Division at Headquarters ISAF (HQ ISAF). Within the first few minutes of arriving in my new office, I was told by the boss that, because all the IO staffs were soon leaving as the end of ISAF X (Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Headquarters – “HQ ARRC”), I would be responsible for the new task of developing the first ISAF Counter-propaganda Plan, which had been top priority for the Commander ISAF (COMISAF, then MGen David Richards, now UK CDS) and a recurring mention during the daily battle update brief.
After doing my mission analysis, talked to all the key players who would have information that could help the development of the plan, and ran several think-tank meetings with all concerned, it became clear that we (ISAF) did not know much about the insurgency, the Taliban, their information activities and the impact on the population. This took me to arrange many meetings with key Pashtun tribal chiefs, many who were also members of parliament, Afghan intelligence officers and former Taliban officials. It took me about a month to complete the plan and present it to COMISAF. However, it was not strictly a “Counter-propaganda Plan”, but a complete overhaul of NATO strategy for the region. It was well received and I was asked to go to HQ Regional Command South (HQ RC-S) in Kandahar to support COMISAF’s main effort over the Winter period, to lead Info Ops plans and pilot elements of the strategy, where I learned much more about the dynamics of the conflict and what was feasible in Afghanistan, especially in the South.
I have to mention that many of the elements discussed in the campaign assessment below are heavily influenced, as some will see, by the the following documents:
- David Kilcullen, “28 Articles“, Military Review, May-June 2006.
- Steven Metz and Raymond A. Millen. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response. U.S. Army War College, Strategic StudiesInstitute, November 2004.
- Mao Tse-tung and Samuel B. Griffith (trans.). On Guerrilla Warfare. University of Illinois Press, September 2000.
- Kalev Sepp, “Best Practices in COIN”, Military Review, May-June 2005, 9-12.
The Battlefield Assessment follows… Continue reading →
